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FRAGMINA V ERBO RU M :
THE VICES’ USE OF LANGUAGE 
IN THE MACRO PLAYS
Michael T. Peterson
In The C as t le  o f  P e rseve ra n ce  (c. 1425), the everyman figure Humanum 
Genus has died after succumbing to avarice in his old age, and is being led 
off to hell by Malus Angelus, who taunts his victim with these words:
Now dagge we hens a dogge tro t.
In my dongion I schal J>e dere.
On J>e is many a synful spot;
jDerfore Jiis schame I schal J>e schere
W hanne J>ou comyst to my neste.
Why woldyst ]xra, schrewe schalt neuere J>e,
But in J>i lyue don aftyr me?
And Jn Good Aungyl taw th  J>e 
Alwey to  J>e beste.
3a, but }>ou woldyst hym not leue;
To Coueytyse alwey >ou drow. (lines 3099-109)1
This speech is typical of the devils and deadly sins — whom we may col­
lectively call the Vices — in the homiletic morality plays. Here the bluff 
derision of Malus Angelus, his scornful “3a!” and use of doggerel ( “Now 
dagge we hens a dogge tro t”) characterize their sardonic eloquence and
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nonsensical volubility. While the Vice ostensibly serves the play’s didactic 
purpose by bringing the precise cause of Anima’s downfall, Covetousness, 
to the attention of the audience, his commentary is also an expression of 
trium ph at the expense of the “Good Aungyl,” and suggests the inability 
of the Virtues to effectively articulate doctrine.
As this example suggests, the coarse antics and parody of the morality 
Vices, like the cruel jokes of the T o rtores  in the devotional Cycle Plays, 
are prominent and often disturbingly appealing, and it is difficult to easily 
explain the uneasy laughter they generate. Scholars influenced by folklore 
studies and theories of the ritual origins of drama, such as A.P. Rossiter, 
see a fundamental ambivalence in the clash of pagan carnival and Christian 
piety .2 Exegetical critics like V.A. Kolve, who argues that the elements of 
mediaeval dram a all contribute to the production of a uniformly Christian 
meaning, suggest th a t an audience would have been able to separate fruit 
from chaff while viewing a performance. Kolve admits that a character like 
Cain in the Wakefield M a c ta t io  A b e l  would certainly be amusing, but only 
at his own expense, drawing “unrestrained and unsympathetic” laughter.3 
M an k in d  (c. 1475), whose energetic Vices make it the most problematic of 
the morality plays from this point of view, affords us further examples of 
these critical positions. David Bevington sees its “earthy humour” as part 
of a popular dram atic tradition which could easily include “earthy humour, 
song, dance, and slapstick violence in the context of a moral tale” .4 Paula 
Neuss, however, draws an exegetical distinction between the idle language 
of the Vices, who represent sloth (A c c id ia ), and the earnest (but boring) 
sermonising of Mercy, who urges the audience to “puryfye yowr sowlys” 
through “goode werkys.” 5
W hat these two positions share is an assumption th a t one can divide the 
plays’language between the nonsense of the Vices and the sense of the soul’s 
heavenly champions, the Virtues. Language is the medium of conflict in the 
morality play, a genre related to mediaeval debate literature. The subject, 
Man, is the target at which the representatives of Heaven and Hell aim their 
arguments. Like good rhetoricians, the contestants’ object is p ersu a s io ,  to 
convince Man th a t a certain way of life is preferable to another. Mankind 
thus has free will only in so far as he is free to choose options represented by 
competing discourses. In each play Mankind is first instructed by the agents 
of God, and then is pulled away, repeatedly in the C astle  o f  P erseveran ce  
and comically in M a n k in d ,  by the opponents. One might think tha t the 
Virtues, armed with G od’s Truth, would enjoy a clear superiority in this 
contest, but in fact the Vices seem to take a particular pleasure in being able
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to “deconstruct” the Word. As we noted above, Malus Angelus is especially 
proud tha t Mankind has chosen Covetousness and dam nation despite the 
fact that “J>i Good Aungyl tawth ee /  Alwey to the beste.” (lines 3106-07) 
The morality plays present systems over which God presides as the ulti­
m ate guarantee of meaning and attem pt to validate doctrines which ensure 
salvation through obedience. To what extent is their success, their unity, 
threatened by the Vices’ subversive use of discourse, obscenity, and prac­
tical jokes? If language and signification can be used to obscure meaning, 
where does tru th , particularly God’s Truth, reside in these plays? Our 
critical anxiety concerning the Vices ultimately seems to stem from their 
ability to verbally subvert the medium of conflict, the medium used to assert 
doctrine, and thus undermine the homiletic project of these plays. Contem­
porary theory has taught us to think of language in terms of its momentary 
applications, rather than as a vehicle for perfect meaning. This paper ex­
amines the plays in light of this theory, and suggests tha t the most valuable 
lesson of the morality play may well be to illustrate the great gulf between 
its speakers and God, the elusive, eternally distant Other.
As every mediaeval churchgoer knew from the account of the Tower of 
Babel in Genesis (lines 1-9), a multiplicity of languages was a punishment 
of m an’s pride and a constant reminder of his fallen state. For St Augus­
tine corporeal, imperfect language was a vexing obstacle in any attem pt to 
discuss or have discourse with the perfect, God. In his C on fess io n s ,  for ex­
ample, he admits to a daydream in which he discusses scripture with Moses, 
and then remembers that he would not understand the prophet’s Hebrew. 
Pursuing the thought, Augustine realizes that he would be no better off if 
the prophet could speak Latin, as then he could only be sure of understand­
ing Moses l i te ra l ly .  However, because of a Neoplatonic distinction between 
ideas and words, Augustine is able to resolve the problem:
Truly w ithin me, within, in the chamber of my thoughts, T ruth , neither 
Hebrew, nor Greek, nor Latin, nor barbarian, w ithout organs of voice or 
tongue, or sound of syllables, would say, “It is tru th ,” and I forthw ith should 
say confidently to  th a t m an of Thine, “thou sayest truly .” 6
It is this belief in a transcendental presence animating language, namely 
God as Logos, which dominates Augustinian semiotics. As Jacques Derrida 
notes in O f  G r a m m a to lo g y , in metaphysics the signifier (s ig n a n s) merely 
bears an “intermediary” relationship to its signified (s ig n a tu m ), while the 
s ign a tu m  “always referred, as to its referent, to a res, to an entity created 
or at any rate first thought and spoken, thinkable and speakable, in the 
eternal present of the divine logos.” 7 Nevertheless, there are points, such
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as his discussion of “heretical punctuation” in Scripture, found in his On  
C h r is t ia n  D o c tr in e ,  Book III, where Augustine admits that the vagaries of 
language have the power to obstruct the truth, and he can only offer faith in 
doctrine as a defence against them .8 For Augustine, the problem ultimately 
lies in the representation of G od’s perfection by means of corporeal language. 
If one describes God as perfection, he writes, “a contradiction in terms is 
created, since if th a t is ineffable which cannot be spoken, then th a t is not 
ineffable which can be called ineffable.” Somewhat uneasily, Augustine 
concludes th a t this contradiction should be passed over silently, “For God, 
although nothing worthy may be spoken of Him, has accepted the tribute 
of the human voice and wished us to take joy in praising Him with our 
words.” 9
Eugene Vance has suggested that Augustine’s solution to this contra­
diction is for the Christian to substitute “vertical dialogue” for “horizontal 
dialogue.” By horizontal dialogue Vance means the earthly love and dis­
course th a t “exiles us from God . . . and is to incur the punishment of 
passions th a t come with — and lead to — m ortality .” 10 Following the ex­
ample of St Paul in 1 Corinthians (14.1-4) Augustine advises the Christian 
to seek a solitary, extra-linguistic relationship with God, or to seek the 
gift of prophecy should the Christian wish to retain a voice in the world.11 
Bernard Gui, biographer of Thomas Aquinas, tells a famous story which 
offers a further example of this “vertical dialogue” th a t transcends earthly 
communication. Asked why he had ceased to work on the S u m m a  Theo-  
logica, Aquinas is said to  have replied that “All my writing is now at an 
end; for such things have been revealed to me that all I have taught and 
written seems quite trivial to me now. The only thing I want now is that as 
God has put an end to my writing, He may quickly end my life also.” 12 The 
S u m m a  itself anticipates this position in its declaration that God cannot be 
known by the intellect through the senses, but may be known through the 
“gratuitous light” of divine grace.13
A similar strategy of ascetic self-isolation is recommended by the Virtues 
of the morality plays. In the play W isdom  (c. 1460), Anima is only imper­
illed when induced by Lucyfer to seek “conversacyon” and “comunycacyon” 
(425-26) with others on earth. Prior to Lucyfer’s arrival, Anima was con­
tent to remain in vertical, extra-linguistic discourse with W isdom ,14 who 
states that:
The hye worthynes of my loue 
Angell nor man can tell playnly.
Y t may be felt in experyens from aboue
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But not spoke ne tolde as yt ys veryly.
The godly loue no creature can specyfye. (lines 61-65)
Unfortunately for Wisdom and his colleagues, the highly eloquent Vices, 
like Lucyfer, do not give Man much opportunity for m editation and spiri­
tual discourse. Lucyfer is not as blustering and riotous as the other Macro 
Vices or as his demonic colleagues in the Cycles, although he does manage 
the occasional “Owt harow I rore” (325) as if to appease the convention. 
His particular talent is in rhetoric, a skill mistrusted by many in the Middle 
Ages. Augustine’s distrust of earthly language lies in his recognition that 
rhetoric can be used to urge “falsehood” as well as “tru th ,” leading him to 
disclaim the title of rhetorician .15 Lucyfer short-circuits M an’s “resone” by 
appealling to his corporeal Mynde, which is vulnerable to “sensualyte” and 
the “fyve owtewarde wyttys” (135-60). The contemplative life of vertical 
discourse, he argues, is difficult to maintain and to fail at it is to risk offend­
ing God “hyghly” (431-36). Lucyfer’s verbal coup is in using the exem plu m  
of the life of Christ to persuade man to seek worldly company:
LUCYFER. And all hys lyff was informacyon 
Ande example to man.
Sumtyme wyth synners he had conversacyon;
Sumtyme wyth holy also comunycacyon;
Sumtyme he laboryde, preyde; sumtyme tribulacyon;
Thys was vita mixta )>at Gode here began;
Ande }>at lyff xulde ye here sewe. (lines 423-29)
Mynde is dazzled by these rhetorical fireworks and can not argue the obvious 
defence, tha t Christ led a “vita  m ix ta ” but did not share fallen m an’s natura  
m ix ta .  “Your resons be grete” (448) is his only response.
Humanum Genus in the Castle  o f  P erseveran ce  is similarly seduced into 
worldly discourse, but is rescued after a battle between the Seven Virtues 
and Seven Deadly Sins. Now in his old age, he is sheltered in the castle of 
the virtues, “pese ladys of goodnesse” who have shown him “to blysse” :
It is but foly, as I gesse,
Al )>is werldys wele iwys.
J>ese louely ladys, more and lesse,
In wyse wordys J>ei telle me }>ys.
]?us seyth J>e bok of kendys. (lines 2509-13)
Despite this doctrinal authority, Avarice quickly seduces Mankind into re­
nouncing “blysse.” The Vice makes no attem pt to disguise his purpose, and 
even stresses the addictive nature of covetousness, which he represents as 
worldly security:
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In }>is bowre I schal J>e blys;
Worldly wele schal be J>i wage;
More mucke J>anne is l>yne iwys 
Take J>ou in J>is trost terage
And loke }>at Jj o u  do wronge.
Coveytyse, it is no sore,
He wyl }>e feffen ful of store,
And alwey, alwey, sey “more and more” ,
And i>at schal be J>i songe. (lines 2704-712)
Mankind is completely enthralled by this teaching, which embodies the exact 
opposite of the holy doctrine of charity, and says “A, Coveytyse, haue >ou 
good grace! /  Certys J>ou beryst a trewe tonge” (lines 2713-14).16
The figure of Mercy, in the play of M ankin d ,  is realistically aware that 
the Vices, “Nyse in t>er aray, in language J>ei be large,” will attem pt to 
“perverte” his ward, and warns Mankind accordingly (294-98). Mankind’s 
spiritual arsenal includes the Word Itself, the passage from Job (34.15) 
which reminds him “th a t you are dust, and to dust you will return.” How­
ever, the Vices, on the strength of their subversive eloquence, are able to 
drive home a wedge of language which corrodes Mankind’s faith in his coun­
sellor’s discourse (594-604). As the devil tells the audience, this story is a 
“praty game,” and yet while it is outrageously false and contrived, by ad­
vising Mankind to seek “mercy” of the three rogues Tytyvillus is skillfully 
manoeuvering him into a new discourse, where he will be constituted as a 
new subject, and subject to new counsel. Here we might modify Vance’s 
terms, horizontal and vertical dialogue, terms implicated in structuralism 
and metaphysics, and speak instead of discursive knowledge, in which iden­
tity can only be established by the presence of the addressed Other.
According to Emile Benveniste, the identifying pronouns “I” and “you” 
are only referential momentarily, at the moment of utterance in discourse. 
“The reality to  which [the pronoun I] refers,” Benveniste writes, “is the 
reality of the discourse. It is the instance of discourse in which designates the 
speaker that the speaker proclaims himself as the ‘subject’ .” 17 The Mankind 
figures in the morality plays are constantly being shaped by discourse, which 
is the source of competing knowledges, earthly and spiritual. The role of 
the Virtues is to fix Mankind in a discursive knowledge with his Creator 
while leading him out of the world, as Catherine Belsey notes:
To know God [in the Middle Ages] was not to m aster an object of knowl­
edge, but to  apprehend a meaning which was also tru th . God, the Logos, 
a t once divinity, concept and word, was pure meaning and pure being, the 
transcendental signified and referent, and fully to know God was not to dif­
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ferentiate oneself from the objects of knowledge but, on the contrary, to be­
come absorbed in to ta l presence, to be transformed and ultim ately dissolved. 
Knowledge was also practice, uniting meaning and being in submission to the 
discourse and the discipline of salvation .18
However, as we have already noted, the advocates of God, of the tran ­
scendent signified, have difficulty subjecting Mankind within this divine 
discourse. The Vices’ goal is to sabotage or render untrustworthy all signi­
fying systems which might lead man to knowledge, and to leave him alone 
and confused in the fallen world of non-meaning. In M an k in d ,  for example, 
Tytyvillus hides M an’s grain and slips a plank into the ground .19 After strik­
ing the wood with his spade, Man exclaims that “Thys londe ys so harde 
yt m akyth [me] wnlusty and yrke” (545), and abandons his useful labour. 
Tytyvillus’ plank, like his story of Mercy fled to France, is a ploy to ensnare 
Man, and yet as a signifier it is real in and of itself. As David Bevington 
notes, the ground is literally “stiff as a board .” 20
Belsey is one of several critics who have noticed that the morality Vices 
deal in an “engaging nonsense which scrambles the discourse of salvation .” 21 
Avarice in The C astle  o f  P erseveran ce  exhorts the other Deadly Sins to 
“Feffyn hym [Mankind] wyth 3oure foly” (1026). In the same play the Vices 
are especially fond of metrical and alliterative tags ,22 which are meaning­
less but attractive signifiers. Such signification, as Augustine complains in 
his O n True R elig ion , is a worldly snare, for “Some perverse persons . . . 
set more store by their ears than by their intelligence.” 23 The Vices’ most 
effective weapon is obscenity. While debating with his rivals in P e r s e v e r ­
ance, Malus Angelus frequently uses verbal abuse to deny his opponent any 
rational foothold in the argument:
MALUS ANGELUS:
3a, whanne }>e fox prechyth, kepe wel 3ore gees!
He spekyth as it were a holy pope.
Goo, felaw, and pyke of )>o lys 
jDat crepe }>er upon J>i cope!
|3 i p art is pleyed al at J>e dys 
J )a t ]x>u schalt haue here, as I hope.
Tyl Mankynde fallyth to podys prys,
Coveytyse schal hym grype and grope 
Tyl sum schame hym schende.
Tyl m an be dyth in dethys dow 
He seyth neuere he hath inow. 
p erfo re , goode boy, cum blow
At my nejjer ende! (lines 802-14)
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Bonus Angélus is seemingly at a loss to counter this barrage of words and 
withdraws, leaving Man to bad company. Similarly. Mercy in M an k in d  does 
not respond when asked by Nowadays to translate his obscene couplet into 
Latin “in clerycall manere” (130-34).24 One is thus left to wonder if the 
Virtues have any power at all in earthly discourse.
New-Guise, Nought, and Nowadays, the Vices of the play M a n k in d , are 
especially adept at jam m ing the broadcasts of the Virtues. Their scatologi­
cal, antiphonic “Crystemes songe” (331-43) even incorporates the audience 
in apparently harmless fun, which actually demolishes the content of the 
ideal, liturgical antiphon, dedicated to the praise of God, while leaving its 
shell standing:
NOUGHT:
Now I prey all )>e yem andry J»at ys here 
To synge wyth ws w yth a mery chere:
[He sings a line at a time; New-Guise and  
Nowadays lead the audience in singing after him ]
Y t ys w retyn wyth a coll, y t ys wretyn wyth a cole,
NEW -GYSE and NOWADAYS:
Y t ys w retyn wyth a colie, yt ys wretyn wyth a colie,
NOUGHT:
He }>at schytyth w yth hys hoyll, he }>at schytyth wyth hys hoyll, 
N EW -GYSE and NOWADAYS:
He )>at schytyth w yth hys hoyll, he J>at schytyth with hys hoyll, 
NOUGHT:
B ut he wyppe hys ars clen, but he wyppe hys ars clen,
N EW -GYSE and NOWADAYS:
B ut he wype hys ars clen, but he wype his ars clen,
NOUGHT:
On hys breche yt xall be sen, on hys breche yt xall be sen.
NEW -GYSE and NOWADAYS:
On hys breche yt xall be sen, on hys brech yt xall be sen.
A ll s ing :
Holyke, holyke, holyke! holyke, holyke, holyke! (lines 333-43)25
These Vices ridicule M an’s useful labour, devalue the clerical Latin of Mercy, 
and by ramm ing bits of decontextualised scripture together they are able to 
use even the Word with ironic intent, using the Psalms as an anti-fraternal 
jibe and to suggest th a t sin is best committed in the company of others 
(323-26). The Vices’ ability to turn the Word itself into a weapon is seen in 
other plays, such as W isd o m .  In P ersevera n ce  Avarice subverts the proverb, 
a traditional vehicle of instruction, by using one of C ato’s distichs ( C a to n is  
D is i ic h ia  2.17) to urge Man to repudiate charity (854-66).
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The stream  of abuse, nonsense, and deceit generated by the Vices 
serves, as Belsey notes, “to draw attention to the signifier at the expense of 
m eaning .” 26 One is left to wonder if an inadvertent lesson of the morality 
plays is to dem onstrate the absence of any metaphysical underpinnings to 
language, which is merely free-floating and subject to its user’s intentions. 
As we have seen, Augustine, like the Virtues in these plays, ultim ately coun­
sels faith as a solution to our inability to represent the ineffable in corporeal 
language. Like the Everyman figure who represents us, we the audience 
are hindered by earthly faculties and are denied the presence of God until 
language ceases with death. Consciousness, as Derrida understands it, is en­
meshed in and is the effect of a semiological chain, continuous and without 
origin, where signs mean because of other signs and the play of difference 
between them .27 Lacking any ultim ate guarantee of meaning which would 
render language “innocent” and “neutral” ,28 all discourse becomes highly 
self-interested:
If words and concepts receive meaning only in sequences of differences, one 
can justify  one’s language, and one’s choice of terms, only within a topic [an 
orientation in space] and an historical strategy. The justification can therefore 
never be absolute and definitive.29
While the morality play attem pts to present God as the ultim ate guarantee 
of meaning, it tends to become a plurality of competing discourse. Its 
results are provisional. In M a n kin d  the action ends on earth, with Man 
apparently better prepared to meet his heavenly judge. Tytyvillus and 
his crew have been vanquished by some comic stage business, but their 
defeat is unconvincing. Mercy tells the departing audience to “Serge 3our 
condicyons wyth dew examinacion” (908), suggesting that the Vices’ defeat 
is only temporary. They are lurking in wait for future Everymen, and, as 
with Beckett’s E n d g a m e , one suspects that the play’s action could happen 
all over again. In P ersevera n c e  Man is redeemed by Mercy only after death 
and the end of earthly language. The plays themselves evade closure in 
that they call attention to their illusory nature. “Thynke and remembyr 
>e world ys but a wanite,” says Mercy in M ankind , “As yt ys prowyd 
daly by diuerse transm utacyon” (909-10). God himself in The C as i le  o f  
P ersevera n c e  suddenly ceases to be a P a te r  sedens  in ju d i t io  and now, 
merely an actor, breaks the audience’s spell:
p u s  endyth oure gamys.
To saue 30U fro synnynge 
Evyr at Jje begynnynge
thynke on 3oure last endynge! (lines 3645-48)
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As noted above, the plurality of these plays, especially of M an k in d ,  af­
fects critics in several ways. Bevington describes Tytyvillus and his hench­
men as “thoroughly engaging rascals,” 30 while Bernard Spivack thinks it the 
paradox of the morality play tha t the Vices become “theatrically fascinat­
ing .” 31 David Zesmer and Hardin Craig find M an k in d  exasperating. Zesmer 
complains tha t “Titivillus and his grotesque crew simply revel in foul speech 
and coarse antics, almost to the point of obscuring the moral purpose for 
which these characters were introduced .” 32 Craig ascribes its obscenity to 
a debased popular tradition, calling M an k in d  “ignorant, corrupt, probably 
degenerate, and vulgar.” 33 This plurality persists in the later morality plays 
even after their focus becomes more secular, as in Skelton’s M agnyfycence ,  
where there is a long internal sequence of stage business for fools and Vices 
tha t has, a t best, a tenuous relation to the plot. As we have seen, one can 
explain this tra it, as Bevington and Happé34 have done, by associating the 
Vices with popular theatre, although such a theory fails to consider the lin­
guistic implications raised by the Vices’ use of language. Following the lead 
of D.W. Robertson, Jr, one could invoke Augustinian notions of the correct 
and incorrect use of material signifiers, and argue, as Spivack does, th a t the 
Vices show Man the incorrect use of worldly things while contributing to 
the plays’ homiletic function. Such a mediaevalism would however remain 
within the tradition of western metaphysics. As I have argued, the Vices 
in these plays dem onstrate that language is the slipperiest of mediums, and 
th a t to look beyond it for a guarantee of meaning requires a leap of faith of 
Augustinian proportions.
Paul Zumthor has stated, without alarm, tha t the mediaeval text tends 
towards the ironic interplay of “yes and no, obverse/re verse” and produces 
a meaning which “in the last analysis, would present itself as enigmatic, the 
enigma being resolved into simultaneous and contradictory propositions.” 35 
For Zumthor, mediaevalism is “writing-reading, reading-writing: a play of 
mirrors catching the reflection of dead values in the glass of lived values, 
p e r  specu lum  in a e n ig m a te .”36 We should thus not be too distressed by our 
inability to clearly distinguish a victor in these absurd but deadly serious 
debates. W hat we need to develop instead is an understanding of that pro­
foundly didactic text, the morality play, which recognizes both the shaping 
nature and strategic uses of its discourse, discourse that is neither nonsen­
sical nor transcendent, but merely self-interested.
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NOTES
1 All references to  M ankind,  The Castle of Perseverance, a n d  to  W isdom  a re  to  
The Macro Plays,  ed. M ark  Eccles, E E T S 262 (London 1969).
2 A .P. R ossiter, in  English. Drama From Early T imes to the Elizabethans (New York 
1967), w rites th a t  “th e  M oral P lay  ten d s to  sp lit in to  ‘layers’ ra th e r  as sla te  does, one set 
of laminae  s till concerned  w ith  m orality , th e  o th e r  w ith m irth  an d  im m oralities, o r m ere 
farce a n d  horsep lay” (p . 98). A recen t essay by A nthony G ash, “C arnival A gainst Lent: 
T he A m bivalence o f M ediaeval D ram a,” in  Mediaeval Literature: Criticism, Ideology, 
History,  ed. D av id A ers (B rig h to n  1986) 74-98, develops E ossite r’s thesis. G ash  exam ines 
th e  c onnection  betw een  M ankind  a n d  th e  Shrove Tuesday an d  C hristm as custom s referred  
to  in th e  play, in  th e  ligh t of M ikhail B a k h tin ’s theory  of th e  cam ivalesque. He finds th a t  
p a ro d ie  e lem ents such  as th e  p a p a l p a rd o n  (144-46), m isapplication  of psalm s (324-25), 
a n d  th e  d a rk ly  hum orous references to  h ang ing  (516, 520) a re  expressions o f folk h um our 
u nderm in ing  th e  p restige  o f ecclesiastical a n d  ju d ic ia l au thority , a n d  argues th a t  while th e  
p lay ’s hero  is allegorically  m ank ind , “i t  m u st have been  easy for th e  ru ra l aud ience to  see 
h im  as a  p o o r  lab o u re r whose to il does n o t always seem  com patib le w ith church-going” 
(94). O n  th e  cam ivalesque  elem ent in  m ediaeval lite ra tu re , see B ak h tin ’s Rabelais and 
His World,  tran s . H. Isowolsky (C am bridge, M ass. 1968) an d  also his essay “FYom th e  
P reh is to ry  of N ovelistic D iscourse," in  The Dialogic Imagination,  tran s . C ary l E m erson 
a n d  M ichael H olquist (A u stin  1981) 41-83.
3 V.A. Kolve, The Play Called Corpus Christi  (S tan fo rd  1966) 140.
4 D avid  B eving ton , From M ankind  to Marlowe  (C am bridge, Mass. 1962) 18. Sim­
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